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seal. All judicial question, however, has been concluded on
this subject also by this court."
In conclusion, we may regard the Ameaican decisions as new
pretty well harmonized on the general principle, that a sealed
instrument, executed by one partner only, in the firm name,
is not valid to create a new liability on the part of the other
partners, unless such liability is one which the partner could
have created without seal, or unless his act was previously
authorized or subsequently ratified by the other partners; and
that such authority or ratification may be by parol, and may
be inferred by a jury from the acts of the parties or the course
J.M.L.
of the business.
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The word "place," where the bank is located, used in the Acts of Congress
in reference to the taxation of national banks, means the Sae in which the
bank is located.
The Acts of Congress of Feb. lOth, 188, which prescribes that the taxation of
the shares in national banks "shall not be at a greater rate than Is assessed
upon any other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens," is satisflied if the rate upon bank shares is the same as the rate upon moneyed capital
in the hands of individual citizens in the town or city where the bank is located.
Where the rate of taxation is the same for individual capital and shares of
non-resident owners of national bank stock, the fact that the latter are taxed
specifically, for the benefit of the State treasury, and the former for localmuni.
cipal purposes, does not make the tax invalid, as in conflict with the Act of
Congress.

Benjamin F. Thomas for the plaintiffs.
Charles Allen (Attorney-General) and Clement Hugh Hil
11r the defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
AmES, J.-By the terms of the Act of Congress of June 30,
1864, under which the national banks have come into existence,
all the shares in each of said banks are made taxable in the
place in which the bank is "located," without any regard whatever to the legal domicile of the shareholders respectively. This
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provision forms a part of the organic law under which every
such bank has its being, and under which the stockholders contribute to its capital. This court has recently decided (Austin
v. Aldermen of Boston, 14 Allen 359) that the word "place,"
as used in the statute, means the "State" within which the bank
is located. And the subsequent amendatory Act of Congress
(of Feb. 10, 1863) uses the following language: "The words
the place where the bank is located and not elsewhere, shall
be construed and held to mean the State within which the bank
is located; and the legislature of each State may determine
and direct the manner and place of taxing all'the shares of
national banks located within said State, subject to the restriction that the taxation shall not be at a greater rate than is
assessed upon any other moneyed capital in the bands of individual citizens of such State, and provided always that the
shares of any national bank owned by non-residents of any State
shall be taxed in the city or town where said bank is located,
and not elsewhere." The legislature of this commonwealth, by
the statute of 1868, chapter 349, passed June 11th of that year,
entitled "An Act concerning the Taxing of Bank Shares," has
undertaken to determine and direct the manner in which all
the shares of slock in banks, whether of issue or not, existing
by authority of the United States, shall be taxed. The act
provides, among other things, that such shares owned by nonresidents of this commonwealth shall be assessed to the owners
thereof in the cities or towns where such banks are located,
and not elsewhere; that the tax shall be a lien on their shares;
that the value of such shares shall be omitted from the valuation upon which the rate is to be based; and that the proceeds of the tax on such shares, when collected, shall be paid
over by the treasurer of the town or city to the State treasurer. The plaintiffs insist that this statute, so far as it applies
to non-resident stockholders, is one which the legislature had
no right to enact; that the tax assessed under it upon such
stockholders is invalid; and that the lien it assumes to create
upon the stock cannot be enforced.
The counsel for the plaintiffs insist that three "landmarks"
have been established in this broad field of inquiry, viz.: that*
18
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the shares of the stockholders of the national banks are distinct
subjects of taxation; that they may be assessed and taxed without deducting from their valuation that portion of the corporate
capital invested in the bonds of the United States; and last,
and most important of all for the purposes of this inquiry, that
the banks, being agencies of the general government in the execution of its powers and functions, the States have no power to
tax their capital, except under the permission of Congress. It
is also established by statute that the shares are taxable in the
place (that is to say the State) where the bank is located, and not
elsewhere; that the legislature of each State may determine and
direct the manner and place within such State of taxing such
shares (with a restriction against oppressive and hostile taxation) ; and that, in the case of shares belonging to persons not
residing within the State, the place of taxation shall be the
city or town in which the bank is located, and not elsewhere.
A citizen of Connecticut or Rhode Island, therefore, owning
shares in a national bank in Massachusetts, is not to be taxed
for them in Connecticut or Rhode Island. They can only be
taxed in Massachusetts, a provision which relieves him of all
danger of being twice taxed for the same property: Flint v.
Aldermen of Boston, 99 Mass. 141. The Acts of Congress in
regard to such shares belonging to non-resident stockholders
apparently are intended to annul, as to them, the general
rule that personal property follows the person, and has no
locality other than the domicile of the owner, and to attach
to such shares, for some purposes and to some extent, the
local character and fixity of real estate. They are proper
subjects of taxation in the town where the bank in question
is located; and the legislature of the commonwealth (as the
above quoted Act of Congress expressly provides that it may)
has, by the statute in question, determined and directed the
manner in which they shall be taxed.
If the Act of 1868, chapter 349, is to be interpreted as providing for the imposition of an excise, in the proper sense of
that term, and as distinguished from a tax, it would be liable
to all the objections so fully pointed out in the recent case of
Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen 268, and could not be
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Atestained. But the plaintiffs do not claim that it was intended
to provide for an excise in the proper sense of that term. On
the contrary, they insist that it is intended to authorize a tax
and not an excise; that the act bears the title of an act concerning the taxation of bank shares; that "tax," and in no case
"duty" or excise, is the term used throughout the statute; that
the provisions for the assessment and collection are appropriafe
to tax rather than to a "duty" or "excise," and are assimilated to the existing provisions of law for the assessment and
collection of taxes on similar property; that the rate of taxation
is required to be the same as on other moneyed capital; that the
same form of expression is used in the statute and in the Acts
of Congress above cited, showing that o tax on property, and
not a duty or excise on the franchise, was intended to be permitted by Congress and imposed by the State; and that the
statute has not been so framed that it could be held valid either
as tax or an excise, whichever its true nature might be. On
the assumption, then, that this argument on the part of the
plaintiffs is well founded, and that the true construction of
the statute is, that it is intended for taxation, and not for an
excise or duty, can it be maintained as a valid exercise of
power on the part of the legislature?
The objection that it conflicts with the restrictions expressly
provided for by the two Acts of Congress, is one which meets
us at the threshold of the inquiry, and may very properly be
considered first. The power of the State to tax the shares is
subject to the restriction that the tax shall not be "at a greater
rate than is assessed upon any other moneyed capital in the
hands of individual citizens of the State." We think that this
clause was obviously intended to preclude the possibility that
property of that description should be singled out for special
and peculiar taxation. Its operation would be to prevent oppressive and hostile discriminations unfavorable to the banks.
A State, if there were no such restrictions, might so arrangeits
method of taxation as substantially to expel the national banks
from its limits. It must be assumed that this system of banking was devised by the national legislature for national purposes, as on agency of government in the exercise of its powers
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and functions, and that for public reasons it was intended that
it should be general and uniform throughout the country. It
might well seem reasonable to Congress to take some precaution
that the banks in each State should be taxed only at the some
rate and generally in the same manner as the moneyed capital
of individual eitizens is taxed in the same State. The language
of the Act of Congress does not require the strict, literal and
narrow interpretration that might be proper in the construction
of a penal statute. It means merely, as we think, that such
shares shall be taxed upon a general system and in compliance
with a set of rules and principles applied alike throughout the
State to the taxation of all moneyed capital. It means that the
rate upon a thousand dollars, invested in such a bank, shall be
the same as the rate'upon a like sum put out at interest on
good security; that as far as mere taxation is concerned, the
owner of the one investment shall fare neither better nor worse
than the ascertained owner of the other: that banks are not to
be oppressed or incommoded, nor their operations as agencies of
the general government to be prevented or impeded byinvidious
and unfavorable rates, as compared with other property of the
same general kind, in the same place. A strictly literal construction of the clause would lead to such results that practically it would be a matter of almost insuperable difficulty to lay
any legal tax at all upon that form of investment. If the words
mean that the rate is to bethe lowest that is assessed upon any
moneyed capital in any part of the commonwealth, one result
would be, that the owners of bank stock would be assessed, in
Boston for example, at less than the rate of taxation on other
moneyed capital, or other property generally, owned by other
residents of the same city. It may be assumed that generally
the taxation in large cities will be at a higher rate than in rural
and small farming towns. There would not only be one rate
on bank stock, and another and higher rate on other property,
but the assessors of Boston, before fixing upon the rate for bank
stock, must inform themselves what is the lowest rate of taxation on moneyed capital in any one of the verymany municipal
bodies into which this State is subdivided. When they have
obtained that information, on this construction of the Act of
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Congress, they will have ascertained the maximum rate proper
to be observed in the taxation of bank stock. Then suppose
that Boston, on its being ascertained that the tax on money
capital in some small town in the county of Berkshire, or in the
cownty of Franklin, has been fixed at five cents on the hundred
dollars of valuation, should adopt that same rate for the taxation of bank stock; and suppose it should happen that the
assessors of the city of Worcester, for example, in order to be
certain not to endanger the validity of their tax by adopting
too high a rate, should take the precaution to fix their rate upon
,bank stock at four cents and nine mills on the hundred dollars, is the Boston tax to be thereby'rendered illegal and void
for being in conflict with the restfiction contained in the Act
of Congress of February 10, 1868 ? Whjr not, if the lowest
rate on any moneyed capital is the only legal rate?
Is the tax on bank stock throughout the commonwealth to be
determined and absolutely controlled by the decision of some
small country village, in which there happens to be no bank,
and in which the municipal wants and expenses are sliglht and
insignificant? Yet the literal construction of the words "at a
rate no greater than is assessed upon any other moneyed capital
in the hands of individual citizens of the State," would lead to
precisely this result. It is impossible to believe that such was
the purpose of the act, or that such would be a reasonable and
fair interpretation of its meaning. In our judgment it satisfies
the meaning of the restriction, if the rate upon bank shares is
the same as the rate upon moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens in the town or city where the bank is located.
Another objection, which is the one principally urged in the
argument is, that the tax in controversy is not proportional.
If this objection should prove to be well taken, the tax is illegal and void. It is not in the power of Congress to authorize
the legislature to adopt a system which fails in so important
and vital a particular. But in what way does this alleged want
of fair proportion manifest itself,and in what does it consist ?
If we compare the case of the non-resident stockholder with
those resident in the town where the bank is established, we
find that they pay at exactly the same rate on their shares.
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If we compare his case with individuals, citizens of the same
place, owning other moneyed capital, we find that they also pay
at the same rate on their respective valuations. Suppose it to
be true that they all pay at a higher rate than would be charged
if the shares belonging to non-residents were included in the
valuations, yet, as they all pay at one uniform rate, there is no
disproportion as among themselves. The rate of one town may
be very different from the rate in the adjoining town; but it is
not necessary, in order to meet the requirement, that taxes
shall be proportional, that the rate shall be identical in all the
very great number of municipal corporations throughout the
State. Each town determines for itself what amount of expenditure its wauts require, or its valuation aud local circumstances
will justify; and of course the rates differ very widely in different places, yet they have never been called in question as
not being proportional on account of discrepancies of that nature. We do not understand that there is any complaint that
one set or class of stockholders, in banks, is taxed on a different system from the rest; or that there is any want of due
proportion among the stockholders, as compared with each
other, or with other individuals owning moneyed capital. The
proportion, on which we understand the plaintiffs to insist as
the only constitutional and legal basis on which taxes can be
assessed, is that which the whole amount to be raised by taxation under the description of State, county and municipal taxes,
bears to the entire amount of all the property taxable within
the commonwealth. How stands the case in view of this objection ?
If our statute of 1868, chapter 349, had simply provided that
the tax on bank shares belonging to persons not residing within
the State should be paid into the treasury of the town or city
where the bank is, and should make a part of the funds of such
town or city; in other words, if such shares were included in
the valution, and taxed as the real estate of non-resident
owners is taxed, the case would present no difficulty, or rather
the case would not have arisen. But the statute requires that
the value of such shares shall be omitted from the valuation
upon which the rate is to be based: and also that the taxes
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upon such shares, though paid in the first instance to the treasurer .of the town or city where the bank is, shall be accounted
for by him to the State Treasurer, and appropriated to the use
of the commonwealth. The effect of the statute, then, will be
that the whole amount of the State, county and town taxes (so
far as they affect property and not polls), is levied upon the
whole amount of all the taxable property in the State, except
only the shares of non-resident stockholders in the national
banks established within the State. That is to say, the whole
of the property tax, falling within that classification, is imposed
upon only a part of the taxable property of the commonwealth;
a large part undoubtedly, but confessedly only a part. The
plaintiffs claim that the rate of taxation is higher and the tax
larger, to each individual tax-payer, than they would be if
literally the whole of the taxable property were charged wit
the whole of the tax.
As we understand the argument in behalf of the plaintiffs, it
may be illustrated in this manner: Suppose the whole amount
of the property, which, by the terms of the statute, is to be
omitted from the general valuation forming the basis of taxation, to be so large that its omission would diminish that valuation to such an extent, that in order to raise the whole amount
of the taxes, it should become necessary to increase the rate of
taxation from four cents on each hundred dollars to five cents
Of course these figures are here taken arbitrarily, merely for
the purpose of illustration, and without any attmepttoapproximate the exact state of the facts. Assuming these figures, we
should have the taxes upon property included in the valuation,
apparently twenty per cent. higher than they would be under a
system requiring the whole of the taxable property to paythe
whole of the property tax. This same rate, made by the ope.
ration of the statute, as the plaintiffs insist, to stand at twenty
per cent. above the true constitutional ratio and its true and
egal proportions, is then imposed by the statute upon the
shares belonging to non-resident owners. And the plaintiffs
insist that, whatever may be the state of things among the
stockholders as compared with each other, the rate and the
amount both are not in that ratio to the taxable property which
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alone is recognized by the Constitution as the true and just
proportion.
It is quite apparent that this objection, if well founded, is
very far from being peculiarly applicable to the case of nonresident owners of bank stock. If the fact that the whole
amount of the property taxes is levied upon less than the
whole amount of the taxable property is a valid objection, is
sufficient to vitiate the whole tax. The owners of bank stock,
moneyed capital, or in fact of any other description of taxable
property included in the valuation, would apparently have as
much reason to complain of the disproportion, as the non-resident owners of bank stock. If the principle of assessment
should prove to be erroneous and vicious, and prohibited by the
terms of the Constitution, the tax is all wrong from beginning
to end, and cannot be enforced against owners of bank stock,
whether resident or not resident in the Stat6, nor in fact
against any owners of property whatever.
It is true that, under the operation of the statute, a part only
of the taxable property of the commonwealth is made to pay the
whole of the county tax, the city and town tax, and also the
whole amount of what is annually voted by the legislatare specifically as the State tax, so far as these three descriptions of tax
are assessed upon property and not upon polls. The money
obtained from the assessment of bank stock belonging to nonresident owners does not make.any part of either one of these
three descriptions of tax. But although not known as the
State tax eo nomine, it is, nevertheless, a tax for the use and
benefit of the State. It goes into the public treasury, and
makes a part of annual w'ays and means of the State. The
effect of the statute, if carried out, would be to furnish the commonwealth with a regular source of income capable of making a
valuable addition to the public revenue, varying perhaps somewhat from year to year, but not subject to any violent or sudden fluctuations, and generally admitting of a reasonably close
estimate in advance. We are bound judicially to know the
fact that the large amounts annually appropriated by the legis.
lature for the payment of the expenses of the commonwealth,
are mainly supplied by the imposition of the State tax. We
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are bound also to assume that, in determining the imount of
that State tax, the legislature takes into consideration all the
sources of income from any other quarter which the State has
at its command, including among them the tax provided for by
this statute; and that the general State tax annually voted is
intended to cover deficiencies of revenue, and to provide the
necessary ways and means for the varying exigencies of the
public service. The Acts of Congress have made certain prop.
erty taxable here, which without these Acts might not be so
taxable. They have also authorized the legislature to determine and direct the manner of such taxation. This it has
undertaken to do by a statute which provides that this new
taxation shall be so managed as to enure wholly the benefit
of the State treasury, and not be applied to merely local and
municipal purposes. The statute assumes that, to the stockholder not residing within the State, the appropriation of such
tax is a matter of no interest or importance. It does not concern him, so long as the amount is ascertained on the same
principles and the tax is assessed at the same rate as it would
be if he resided in the same city or town where the bank is
established.
We do not understand the plaintiffs to 'deny that their shares
are proper subjects of taxation in Boston, or to complain that
there is any disproportion in the taxation of resident and nonresident shareholders in the same place, as compared with each
other. The objection is that by the operation of the statute
they are made taxable at a higher rate, and so for a larger
amount than they would be if they were included in the valuation upon which the rate is to depend. Is this complaint well
founded? It is to be remembered that whatever amount may
be added to the public revenue by the operation of the statute
diminishes to exactly the same extent the amount necessary to
be raised by the State tax, properly and technically so called.
The annual resolve for the assessment of a State tax is what in
parliamentary language is usually called a "deficiency bill."
Suppose that after considering all sources of income other than
taxation, the legislature should find that the sum of twelve
hundred thousand dollars is needed to cover the public expendi

SAVINGS INST. V. BOSTON.

tures of the State; and that the tax on bank shares, belonging
to non-residents and provided for in the terms of the statute.
would produce the sum of two hundred thousand dollars annually. And here it may be repeated that these figures are
assumed arbitrarily, and merely as illustrative of the argument. Upon these figures a tax of one million of dollars would
supply the deficiency, But if the statute were to be repealed
or pronounced unconstitutional and void, and the law so far
change that the bank shares belonging to non-residents should
be included in the municipal valuations, and taxed as other
property of the same kind is taxed, the State would lose from
its annual revenuc the sum of two hundred thousand dollars.
The valuations which form the basis of taxation would be increasedbythe additionof property producing two hundred thousand dollars in taxes annually. The county and municipal taxes,
not being increased, would be assessed upon a larger amount,
and of course at a lower rate; but the State tax, on the other
hand, would be raised from one million to twelve hundredthousand dollars. The general result would be that the tax-payers
would pay exactly what they did before, with not the slightest
change of rate or proportion. In either mode of taxation, the
taxable property would pay into the treasury of the State exactly the same sum, viz.: twelve hundred thousand dollars.
The non-resident stockholders, as a class, do not appear then
to have any cause to complain that the tax upon them as such,
under our statute, is not proportional; and we find nothing in
the agreed facts that distinguishes these plaintiffs from other
non-resident owners generally.
There is a provision in the statute that, in assessing such
shares, there shall be a deduction of a proportionate part of
the value of the real estate belonging to the bank. To that
extent the non-resident stockholder is privileged and favored,
as there seems to be no law requiring or permitting any such
allowance in favor of stockholders residing in the State. This
disproportion was not alluded to in the argument; and no importance, as we suppose, was intended to be attached to it.
It certainly is not one of which these plaintiffs can reasonably
complain.
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The conclusion, then, at which we arrive is, that the statute
of 1868, chapter 849, does not transcend or conflict with the
limitations expressly set forth in the Acts of Congress; that
practically it produces no appreciable disproportion among taxpayers as compared with each other; that the omission of
the shares of non-residents from the town valuations produces
no actual want of due proportion, for the reason that the
general result of the taxation, supposing the statute to be held
valid, is substantially identical to each tax-payer with what it
wouldbeif the shares of non-residents were included in those
valuations and taxed in the same manner in all respects as the
real estate of non-resident owners is taxed; and that, although
in one mode of proceeding the sum total of the valuations is
less than in the other, yet the aggregate of the amount to be
raised under the heads of county, municipal and State taxes, is
diminished in exactly the same proportion. As to the objection
that it is retrospective in in its operation, it seems to be enough
to say that, under the Acts of Congress, the property was certainly taxable in such lawful manner as the legislature of the
commonwealth should direct. Whoever then, on the first day
of May, 1868, held such property knew, or was bound to know,
that it was taxable like other moneyed capital as of that day,
in such manner as by law might be provided.
We do not find in the various objections taken on behalf
of the plaintiffs, and so ably and forcibly urged by their
learned counsel, anything that convinces us that the statute
ought to be pronounced unconstitutional, or that the tax imposed in pursuance of it is unlawful and void. And, according to the terms of the agreement there must be, in each case,
Judgment for the defendant.
The foregoing opinion cannot fail
to be of interest to the profession
and the public. There is no subject
which affects so large a proportion of
the population as that of taxation,
and any question affecting the taxa.
tion of shares in joint stock compa.
nies will have a very wide operation

at the present day, since so large a
portion of moneyed capital is in.
vested in those companies. And the
question of taxation of capital invested In the national banks is becoming one of very wide extension,
and It seems to excite more interest
in consequence of the enormous In.
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come realized in that particular mode
of investment, since men who lhave
investments affording large returns
seem proportionately less inclined to
submit quietly to reasonable taxation. The owners of the most productive stocks seem to feel that taxation is the greater outrage, somewhat
in proportion to the productiveness
of their property. This seems to be
the only satisfactory explanation of
the life and death struggle maintained
for some years past to exempt these
shares In national banks, as far as
possible, from all kinds of taxationAnd the very extreme rule of exemptiag all agencies of the National Government not only from direct and
specific State taxation, which was originally established in the Supreme
Court of the United States, in MeCuloch v. The State of Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316, but even from all indirect taxation of the capital invested
in such agencies, by means of the
valuation of the shares to the owner
in common with that of the other property in the State more recently es.
tablished in that court, seems to have
invited this strenuous resistance to
taxation by the States, of any portion
of the capital invested in the national
banks. We have before sufficiently
discussed that question in these pages,
and we are gratified to find a manifest disposition, both in the State and
national tribunals, as well as in the
legislation of Congress, to allow the
States reasonable scope in taxing the
capital invested in national, banks to
the owners of such capital.
it seems obvious enough, as suggested in the foregoing opinion, that
the Act of Congress, allowing the
States to tax the capital invested in
the national banks, and defining the
mode of its imposition, has hit upon

one not very Just or much in analogj
to the established principles of law
in regard to tile legal situs of personal
property. The attempt is to tax the
capital as such at the place of investment, instead of taxing the owner at his
place of residence, the only legitimate
situs of personality for all other pur
poses. The owner of such shares holds
them by force of the law of his domi.
cle; lie must transfer them, if at all,
whether inter vivs or by bequest or
descent, in conformity with that same
law and the more direct and natural
mode of taxation would seem to be
under the same law which secures its
tenure and its transfer.
But there is no question, probably,
that it may be done in this mode, if
that is, for any reason, deemed most
expedient; but it certainly violates
one cardinal rule of taxation, i. e.,
that all similar property shall be
taxed In the same mode to different
owners. This is an attempt to tax
one portion of the capital stock of the
bank in specie, hot to the bank itself,
where, if anywhere, tile capital exists
in specie, but to the owner of his
shares; not at the place where he
ownership exists, but at the place
where the business is carried on. It
is much like taxing a non-resident
partner in a business firm at the place
where the business is carried on. not
for the property or the business, but
for his interest in the concern. It Is not
important, perhaps, that these analogies Qliould be maintained alwayS.
The question is not affected by the
United States Constitution securing
the same rights to non-resident as to
resident citizens. As the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court
stand, since "Weston V. Charleston, 2
Peters 449, the States have no right
to tax the owner of United States
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vtocks or of shares in the United from the recent constructions of the
States banks, in common with the Supreme Court upon the extent of
other cltizens of the State for similar the exemption of the owners of capiproperty. We have often expressed tal invested in these banks from tamt.
our preference for the rule laid down tion -was fast becoming intolerable,
by Chief Justice XAusHALL, in Mfe- and has finally been attended with
Cuttoc v. Maryland, sapra, that the the usual results of false judicial conprohibition of the United States Con- structions, a resort to legislation, and
stitution against taxing its govern. that, in our judgment, is the chief
mental instruments or agencies" does beneficial result of legislative inter.
not extend to a tax paid by the real ference with thegeneral course ofJuris.
property of the bank in common with prudence, and in that respect it is in.
the other real property within the valuable.
State, nor to a tax imposed on the inHow far the foregoing opinion bas
rest which the citizens of Maryland made the State law imposing this tax
may hold in this institution in common upon the owners of national bank
wuith other property of the same de. capital consistent in all respects with
scription throughout the State." And the Act of Congress, there will proba.
the Act of Congress allowing the bly be some hesitation. It seems tc
States to tax capital invested in na- us the opinion is drawn up with great
tional banks, seems to proceed upon moderation and plausibility, and that
this principle. It is to be regretted its reasoning is conclusive, unless it
that the Supreme Court could not be upon the point of leaving the aslmve seen its way clear, to have sessments or non-resident sharehold
adopted the doctrine of Chief Justice ers out of the valuation, and thereby
AIAasHALL in the leading case of Mc- to some extent, increasing the ratio o:
Cutloch v. Maryland, or rather to needful taxation. The principle oi
have maintained it throughout their the thing cannot, of course, be tested
decisions upon the same subject, since by the degree of that increase. If it
the courts could have moulded such a is valid where it falls far below one.
power with more symmetry than will fifth, as put by the learned judge, it
ue likely to result from piece-meal must be equally so where it exceeds
legislation in Congress. But this one-half. We are sure the profession
latter is better than no relief, and the will be glad to read the opinion.
evil produced and likely to ensue
I. F. R.

Court of Appeals of New York.
GEO. W. MARKIHAM v. WM!. B. JAUDON ET AL.
Where a broker buys stock for a customer under an agreement to pay for
xud carry it, the customer to furnish and keep up a specified margin on the
market value, the broker holds the stock as a pledge for his advances and
commissions, and tnough the customer fails to keep up his margin after notice
and demann, yet tlie broker cannot sell the stock without giving reasonable
votico to the customer of the time and place of sale.

MARKHAM v. JAUDON ET AL.
In an action for damages for the conversion of the stock by sale under such
circumstances, evidence of the custom of brokers is not admissible to show the
rights of the parties or to explain the words "carry" and "margin."
In such action the measure of damages is the highest value of the stock
between the time of the sale and the time of trial.
terling v. .Taudon, 48 Barb. 459; and Ranks v. Drake, 49 Barb. 186 overruled.

THis was an action for damages for the conversion of certain
stock. The defendants, who were stock-brokers, made an
agreement with the plaintiff to purchase and "carry" certain
stocks for him, he to place in their hands ten per cent. of the
market price of the stocks as a "margin," and to keep that
margin good. Defendants purchased the stock, and carried it
until it fell in value, so that their margin was not good, and
after notice to plaintiffs to make it good, they sold the stock.
Plaintiff testified that the stock was bought "in the usual way,
on a margin put up for the purpose of carrying the stock ;"
defendants "were to furnish the money to buy the stock."
Defendants offered evidence to prove that it was the custom
of brokers to sell the stocks on the exhaustion of the margin,
and also that the contract in this case was the usual one between brokers and their customers, and governed by such
custom. This evidence was rejected by the court, and the
jury, under instructions, found a verdict for plaintiffs for the
highest market value of the stock between the time of sale
and the time of trial. The court below granted an order for
a new trial from which plaintiff appealed.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Hu-NT, C. J.-An analysis of the contract in question, and
a separation of the powers and obligations of the parties thereto,
will enable us the better to determine its character. The customer, Mr. Markham, employs the broker, Mr. Jaudon, to buy
certain railroad stocks for his account, and to pay for them,
and to hold them subject to his order as to the time of sale.
The customer advances ten per cent. of their market value,
and agrees to keep good such proportionate advance according to the fluctuations of the market. Waiving for the moment all disputed questions, I state the following as the agreement of the several parties:
The broker undertakes and agrees:
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1st. At once to buy for the customer the stocks indicated.
2d. To advance all the money required for the purchased
beyond the ten per cent. furnished by the customer.
3d. To carry or hold such stocks for the benefit of the customer so long as the margin of ten per cent. is kept good, or
until notice is given by either party that the transaction must
be closed. An appreciation in the value of the stocks is the
gain of the customer and not of the broker.
4th. At all times to have in his name or under his control,
ready for delivery, the shares purchased or an equal amount
of other shares of the same stock.
5th. To deliver such shares to the customer when required
by him, upon the receipt of the advances and commissions,
accruing to the broker, or
6th. To sell such shares upon the order of the customer upon
payment of the like sums to him, and account to the customer
for the proceeds of such sale.
Under this contract the customer undertakes,
1st. To pay a margin of ten per cent. on the current market
value of the shares.
2d. To keep good such margin, according to the fluctuations of the market.
3d. To take the shares so purchased on his order, whenever required by the broker, and to pay the difference between
the percentage advanced by him and the amount paid therefor
by the broker.
The position of the broker is two-fold. Upon the order of
the customer, he purchases the shares of stocks desired by him.
This is a clear act of agency. To complete the'purchase, he
advances from his own funds, for the benefit of the customer,
ninety per cent. of the purchase money. Quite as clearly he
does not in this act as an agent, but assumes a new position.
He also holds or carries the stock for the benefit of the purchaser until a sale is made by the order of the purchaser or
upon his own action; in thus holding or carrying, he stands
also upon a different ground from that of a broker or agent
whose office is simply to buy and sell. To advance money for
the purchase, and to hold and carry stocks, is not the act of a
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broker as such. In so doing he enters upon a new duty
o)tains other rights, and is subject to additional responsibilities.
The plaintiff insists that this relation between the parties is,
arst, that of principal and agent, or broker, when the sharez
were ordered to b6 purchased for the account of the customer
and were so purchased; that in advancing the money to complete the purchase, the relation of debtor and creditor is created
and that thereupon the broker becomes a pledgee of the stock
for the money advanced in its purchase.
The defendants, on the other hand, insist that the relation
of the parties is wholly by force of a mutual and dependent
contract, that defendant's agreement to hold or carry the stock
was dependent on the plaintiffs furnishing them with themeans
to do so, and that when the plaintiff failed in that respect, the
obligation to hold the stock ceased, and the right to sell it
was complete.
In the case of a pledge it is well settled, that upon default
by the debtor the property in the subject of the pledges does
not thereby become absolutely vested in the creditor, but that
the general property still remains in the debtor. To cut off
his claim the creditor may resort to judicial process, or he may
tell without judicial process, upon giving notice to redeem and,
giving notice of the time and place of sale: Wilson v. Little, 2
Conn. 443; 2 Kent. Com. 581, 582; Story on Bailments
§§ 287, 308, 310. Until one of these modes is resorted to, the
right to redeem remains: 1d.
If the theory of the defendants is correct, the plaintiff being
himself in default in the performance of the contract on his
part, can maintain no action; and if the defendants gave
notice to fill the margin, they had the right, on failure so to
fill, to sell without further notice.
A pledge is a delivery of goods by a debtor to his creditor,
to be kept until the debt is discharged; or again, it is a bailment of personal property as security for some debt or engagement: 2 Kent 577; Story on Bailments, § 286.
Ordinarily, all goods and chattels may be the subject of
a pledge, including money, debts, negotiable instruments and
ehoses in action; Story, § 289.
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While the terms of a pledge require that there should be a
delivery of the article, it is not necessary that there be an
actual manual delivery; it is sufficient if there be any of those
circumstances which, in construction of law, are deemed sufficient to pass the possession of the property. Thus, goods at
sea may be passed in pledge by a transfer of the muniments of
title; or goods in a warehouse by the delivery of the key.
So, if the pledgee has the thing already in possession, as by
a deposit or loan, there the very contract transfers to him by
operation of law a virtual possession thereof, as a pledge, the
moment the contract is completed: Story on Bailments, §
297, and authorities cited. Possession may also be temporarily parted with, as between pledgor and pledgee, without
destroying this relation; as where so delivered for and with
an agreement for redelivery; or where it is delivered to the
owner as special bailee or agent: Id., § 299.
While it is true that the dealer in the present case never had
actual possession of the property which he claims to have
pledged, he had it sufficiently to bring his case within the principles of. the law of pledge. The substance of the first branch of
the transaction is this: The plaintiff calls upon the defendants,
who are brokers, to purchase for him certain shares of railroad
stock, and furnishes him with nineteen hundred dollars for that
purpose, agreeing to pay interest upon advances he shall make
in the purchase and commissions. The defendants make the.
purchase, having themselves advanced ninety per cent. of the
purchase money. They bring to the plaintiff the certificates of
stock thus purchased by him and for him, and deliver them to
him as the owner thereof. He thereupon hands them back to
the defendants to hold as security for their advance on the purchase, with interest and commissions. If these precise forms
had been observed, no one would deny that the redelivery of
the certificates would have constituted a strict formal pledge.
In my opinion the transaction, as it took place, amounted to the
same thing. To have delivered the certificates to the plaintiff,
and that the plaintiff should then have returned them to the
defendants, to be held by them as security for their advance
in their purchase, would let.ve the parties in precisely the same
19
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situation as if the defendants had retained them for that
purpose, the form of a delivery to the plaintiffs and a redelivery by him, to the defendants, being waived by agreement
of the parties. It comes fully within the principle I have
already quoted from Story on Bailments, that where the
pledgee has the thing in his possession, the contract of pledge
operates as a delivery the moment the contract is completed:
Story, Bailments, § 297.
The certificates are appropriated as security for an engagement, to wit: the payment of the advance with interest and
commissions. The possession and the delivery are complete in
the abbreviated manner I have described. The right of redemption, in other, words, the ultimate .ownership of the property in the plaintiff was clearly provided for, and was the prominent idea in his mind. There is no evidence here that the
plaintiff necessarily intended a sale of the stock purchased.
He bought it for the purpose of making money. If he could
make more money by holding it permanently than by selling,
no doubt he would continue to hold. But I do not find that
the intention to have or to suffer a sale or a reverse, forms an
element in the definition of a pledge. Nor do I see how the
fluctuating value of the property can be invoked to determine
the transaction. It cannot be doubted, upon the authorities
cited, that shares of stock in an incorporated company, however unsubstantial may be its character, or however fluctuating
their value, may form the subject of a pledge equally with a
cargo of wheat, a vessel, or any other specific article.
In my judgment the contract between the parties to this
action was, in spirit and effect, if not technically and in form,
a contract of pledge. To authorize the defendants to sell
the stock purchased, they were bound first to call upon the
plaintiff to make good his margin, and failing in that, he was
entitled secondly to notice of the time and place where the
stock would be sold, which time and place, thirdly, must be
reasonable. See authorities already cited.
The conclusion at which I have arrived is sustained by Brass
v. Worth, 40 Barb. 648; Clarke v. Meigs, 22 How. Pr. Rep.
340, and by three unreported cases in the Supreme Court. It
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isin hostility to Hanks v. Drake, 49 Barb. 186, Sterling v.

Jaudm, 48 Barb. 459, and if I am correct, these cases must
be deemed to be overruled. No case has heretofore been presented in this court in which the principle is involved. Milli7cen v. Dehon, 27 N. Y. R. 864, was decided upon the ground
that by the express terms of the contract the broker was authorized to sell without notice, upon the customer's default.
In Horton v. Morgan, 19 N. Y. R. 170, it was decided that on
a purchase like the present it was proper for the broker to
take the title to the shares in his own name, and that he was
not bound to keep the same indentical shares for the purchaser,
but that his duty was performed by keeping a sufficient number of shares in his own name or under his control, ready to
respond to the call of the customer. Nothing further was de.
cided in either of these cases. In Wilson v. Little, 2 Coms.443,
was the case of a formal pledge, and, therefore, not an authority in the present case.
The argument of necessity is pressed. It is said that the
stocks which are the subjects of speculation, are fluctuating and
uncertain in their character; that to save the'broker from loss,
prompt action is necessary, and that there is no time for notice
to the dealer. It is said in the same connection, that as the
broker can make nothing by the risk of the stocks, his advantage being limited to his regular interest and commissions, that
it is reasonable, and must have been the understanding, that
he should have the power to protect himsetf against loss by an
immediate sale without notice. I cannot assent to this argument. If there is such necessity, the broker must secure
himself by a special contract, giving him the right to sell
without notice. This, Mr. Jaudon insists, was the case in the
present instance, but the jury have found the fact to be
otherwise. The supposed necessity would be the same if the
stocks had not been purchased by the broker at all, but had
been delivered to him as a formal technical pledge, and'yet
the appellant's counsel does not claim that in that event there
could have been a sale without notice to the dealer of the
time and place at which the sale would be had.
Neither do I perceive the analogy to claims
against con-
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signees or factors whose duty is to sell and remit, in the position
of the defendants. No goods are consigned to them, none are
placed with them for sale. The shares had been purchased
and left in the defendant's hands, not to sell, but to hold. The
time for sale in the judgment of the plaintiff had not arrived
untillong after defendants bad parted with the property. They
were never employed or authorized to sell.
Neither was the transaction an executory contract of sale, in
which the law of vend)r and vendee would apply to the parties.
The plaintiff bought no shares of the defendants. The defendants sold nothing to the plaintiff. Both parties understood the
fact to be the reverse of this, viz.: that the shares had been
purchased from some third person, the defendants having paid
to that person their market value, with ten per cent. of the
plaintiff's money and with ninety per cent of their own money.
In the view of the contract which I have taken, the default
of the plaintiff in not responding to the demand for further
margin (assuming the same to have been sufficiently made)
did not terminate his interest in the shares. He remained
the general' owner entitled to redeem, or to have the shares
or their value delivered to him, on performance of the original contract.
On the trial the defendants offered to prove the existence of
a custom in the city of New York, between brokers and their
customers, by which brokers have the right to sell out the customer's stock on the exhaustion of the margin. This was an
offer, not to explain the meaning of particular terms, or to prove
attending circumstances to enable the court to construe the
agreement, but to change the rights of the parties to a contract.
By the law, as I have interpreted it, the customer did not lose
the title to his stock by any process less than a sale upon reasonable notice, or by judicial proceedings. The broker had no
right to sell without such notice. A practice or custom to do
otherwise would have no more force than a custom to protest
notes on the first day of grace, or a custom of brokers not to
Durchase their shares at all in a case like the present, but to
content themselves with a memorandum, or entryin their books,
of the contract made with their customer. Such practice in
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each case would be in hostility to the terms of the contract, an
attempt to change its obligation, and would be void. The proof
could not therefore be legally given: Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hone,
2 Ooms. 235; Beirne v. Dord, 1 Sold. 101; Thompson v. Ashton, 14 J.317; Thompson v. Riggs, 5 Wall. 663.
This is an action for the conversion of the stock, and the
rule of damages was correctly laid down: Romane v. Allen,
26 N. Y. R. 309; Teft v. Rodgers, 31 N. Y. R. 676; Burt v.
Dutcher, 34 N. Y. R. 493.
The order granting a new trial is reversed, and judgment
for the plaintiff upon the verdict affirmed with costs.
GROVER, J., dissented, holding that plaintiff was bound
to keep his margin good without notice, and having failed to
do so was not entitled to recover at all. He was also of
opinion that the evidence of custom should have been admitted, and that if plaintiff could recover at all he was entitled only to nominal damages.
WOODRUFF, J., also dissented, holding that evidence of the
custom of brokers should have been admitted, and concurring with GROVER, J., as to the measure of damages.
Supreme Court of the United States.
THE BARK GRAPESHOT, GEO. LAW, CLAIMANT, V. WALLERSTEIN.
When,during the late civil war, portions of the insurgent territory were occupied by the Federal forces, the President, as commander-in-chief, as a meas.
ure of government of such territory, had power legally to establish therein
courts for the determination of controversies and the administration ofjustice.
The United States Provisional Court for the State of Louisiana, organized
was authorized to exercise
under an order of the President, of October 20, 1862,
say, "to hear, try and de.
to
is
order-that
that
by
conferred
the jurisdiction
termine all causes, civil and criminal, including causes in law, equity, revenue
and admiralty."
Wheu Congress, by virtue of its constitutional authorityovernatinalcourts
enacted that "all judgments, orders, decrees and decisions" of the "United
States Provisional Court for the State of Louisiana, iii cases which would ordinarily have been properly cognizable by the Circuit Court of the United States,
should be transferred to" and become the judgments, orders, decrees and decisions of that court, enforced, pleaded and proved accordingly, a decree in
admiralty rendered in said United States Provisional Court, became at once the
decree of the United States Circuit Court, and from it an appeal lay to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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This was an appeal from a decree of the United States Provisional Court for the State of Louisiana, by Act of Congress
made a decree of the United States Circuit Court.
In October, 1862, the city of New Orleans, with some of the
surrounding country, being held by the forces of the United
States in armed belligerent occupation, the President of the
United States created, by an executive order, the United States
Provisional Court for the State of Louisiana, appointing CHAS.
A. PEABODY as judge, and giving, among other things, "authority to hear, try and determine all causes, civil and criminal,
including causes in law, equity, revenue and admialty, and
lparticularly all such powers and jurisdiction as belong to the
District and Circuit Courts of the United States, conforming
his proceedings, so far as possible, to the course of proceedings
and practice which has been customary in the courts of the
United States and Louisiana-his judgnent to be final and
conclusive."
This suit was originally brought in the District Court of the
United States, for the district of Louisiana, and was heard
afterward on appeal in the Circuit Court, before Judge CAMPBELL, of that court, who had ordered further proofs to be taken.
Those were taken in Rio Janeiro, and subsequently the case
came into the United States Provisional Court, and was there
heard and decided, and a decree duly entered affirming the
decision of the District Court.
After the termination of the war, Congress enacted that the
records and proceedings of the United States Provisional
Court for Louisiana should be transferred to and become the
records of the Circuit and District Courts of the United State,
for the Eastern District of Louisiana, and that all judgments,
orders and decrees of said court proper for the jurisdiction of
the Circuit Court of the United States, and so transfer to it,
should become the judgments, orders and decrees of said
Circuit Court, and be enforced, pleaded and proved accordingly : 16 U. S. Stat. 344.
From the decisions of the Unitei States Provisional Court no
appeal lay. The judgmenis and decrees of that court were
"final and conclusive," and this was the case as to decisions
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rendered on appeal (as in this case), as well as those in cases
originating there.
It was claimed, however, that the decree in this case made
by Judge PEABODY, affirming the decree of tle United States

District Court, had become, by virtue of the Act of Congress
referred to, a decree of the United States Circuit Court, and
that, as such, an appeal would lie from it to the Supreme
Court of the United States. On this ground the appeal was
brought. The other facts appear sufficiently in the opinion
of the court.
Caleb Cushing and Gen. Benjami i F. Butler for the appel-

lants.
Tlwmas J. Durant for respondents.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
C. J.-The first question to be examined in this case
is one of jurisdiction. The suit shown by the record was originally instituted in the District Court of the United States for
the District of Louisiana, where a decree was rendered for the
libelant. From this decree an appeal was taken to the Circuit Court, where the case was pending, when, in 1861, the
proceedings of the court were interrupted by the civil war.
Louisiana had become involved in the rebellion, and the courts
and officers of the United States were excluded from its limits.
In 1862, however, the national authority had been partially
re-established in the State, though still liable to be overthrown
by the vicissitudes of war. The troops of the Union occupied
New Orleans, and held military possession of the city and such
other portions of the State as had submitted to the General
Government. The nature of this occupation and possession
was fully explained in the case of The Venice, 2 Wall. 259.
Whilst it continued, on the 20th of Octolger, 1862, President
Lincoln, by proclamation, instituted a Provisional Court for
the State of Louisiana, with authority, among other powers, to
hear, try atd determine all causes in admiralty. Subsequently,
by consent of parties, this cause was transferred into the Provisional Court thus constituted, and was heard, and a decree
again rendered in favor of the libelants. Upon the restoration
CHASE,

LAW V. WALLERSTEIN.

of civil authority in the State, the Provisional Court, limited
in duration, according to the terms of the proclamation, by
that event, ceased so exist.
On the 28th of July, 1866, Congress enacted that all suits,
causes and proceedings in the Provisional Court, proper for the
jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Eastern District of Louisiana, should be transferred to that
court, heard and determined therein; and that all judgments,
orders and decrees ofthe Provisional Court in causes transferred
to the Circuit Court, should at once become the orders, judgments and decrees of that court, and might be enforced,
pleaded and proved accordingly: 16 U. S. Stat. 344.
It is questioned upon these facts, whether the establishment by the President of a provisional court was warranted
by the Constitution.
That the late rebellion, when it assumed the character of
civil war, was attended by the general incidents of a regular
war, has been so frequently declared here that nothing further need be said on that point.
The object of the national government, indeed, was neither
conquest nor subjugation, but the overthrow of the insurgent
organization, the suppression of insurrection, and the re-establishment of legitimate authority. But in the attainment of
these ends, through military force, it became the duty of the
national government, wherever the insurgent power was overthrown, and the territory which had been dominated by it was
occupied by the national forces, to provide as far as possible, so
long as the war continued, for the security of persons and property, and for the administration of justice.
The duty of the national government in this respect was no
other than that which devolves upon the government of a regular belligerent occupying, during war, the territory of another
belligerent. It was a military duty, to be performed by the
President as commander-in-chief, and entrusted as such with
the direction of the military force by which the occupation
was held.What that duty is, when the territory occupied by the
national forces is foreign territory, has been declared by this
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oourt in several cases arising from such occupation during the
late war with Mexico.

In the case of Leitensdorfer v. Webb,

20 How. 176, the authority of the officer holding possession
for the United States, to establish a provisional government
was sustained; and the reasons by which the judgment was
supported apply directly to the establishment of the Provisional Court in Louisiana. The cases of Jecker v. Montgomery,
13 How. 498; 18 How. 110; Cross v. Harrison,16 How.
164; United States v. Rice, 4 Wheat. 216, and Texas v. White,

7 Wall 700, may also be cited in illustration of the principles applicable to military occupation.
We have no doubt that the Provisional Court of Louisiana
was properly established by the President in the exercise of
his constitutional authority during the war, or that Congress
had power, upon the close of the war and the dissolution of
the Provisional Court, to provide for the transfer'of cases
pending in that court, and of its judgments and decrees, to the
proper courts of the United States. The case, therefore, being
properly here, we will proceed to dispose of it.1

*

*

*

For a more elaborate consideration
For an accoent of the U. S.Proviof the principles and authorities on sional Court of Louslana, we refer
which the right and duty of a power, readers to 4 Am. Law Register, N. B.,
holding in military occupation hostile 65.
territory, to govern the same and adFor a more complete account of the
minister justice therein depends, we Provisional Judiciary .of Louisiana
refer our readers to the opinion of during the occupation by the:Federal
Judge PEABODY, in United States v. Rei- forces, we refer also to4 Am. Law Reg.,
ter,4 Am.Law Register, N. S.,
434.

N. S.,
257.

Circuit Court of the UVnited States, Southern District of

New York.
THE UNITED STATES V. THE JUDGES OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.
The power of the Circuit Court of the United States to issue a writ of .Prohi.
bition to another court is confined to cases where the issuing of such a writ is
necessary for the exercise of its own jurisdiction, and Is agreeable to the prin.
ciples and usage of law.
I The rest of the opinion is not of general interest.-Ed. A. L. R.

U. S. V. THE SUPERIOR COURT.
'Where an adjudication of bankruptcy of a partnership firm is made by the
District Court, and is brought into the Circuit Court for review under Section 2
of the Bankrupt Act, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is revisory only,
and does not extend beyond a review of questions presented to the District
Court. Any orders or proceedings to carry into execution the orders ordecrees
of the District Court must be made by that court.
Therefore, a suit by one of the bankrupt partners against the other, In a
Sta e court, seeking an account, and the appointment of a receiver, is not such
an interference with the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court as would authorize
it to issue a writ of prohibition.
Whether in any case the Circuit Court has power to issue a writ of prohibi.
tion to a State Court, dubikaur.

THIS was a petition by Abraham Bininger and others, who
were creditors -of said Bininger and A. B. Clark, trading as
Bining~r & Co., for a writ of prohibition to the Superior
Court of New York. The petition showed that the said firm
of Bininger & Co. had been adjudicated bankrupt by the
District Court of the United States for this district, upon
creditor's petition, and the said Clark was now prosecuting
in this court, in pursuance of the second section of the bankrupt law, a proceeding for the review of that adjudication;
that prior to the institution of the proceedings in bankruptcy
in the District Court, the said Clark had filed his bill in the
Superior Court of the city of New York against his partner,
Bininger, for an accounting and for the settlement of the affairs
of the co-partnership, the payment of the debts and the distribution of the assets, and therein a receiver had been appointed,
who was, or claimed to be, in the possession of the property
of the firm; that after the proceedings in bankruptcy were
instituted, the said Clark commenced successively two actions
in the said court, and procured from that tribunal injunctions
restraining the petitioning creditors from prosecuting the
said proceedings.
Bangs, for the petitioners.
Roger A. Pryor,for the respondents.-There is no authority
to issue a writ of prohibition to a State court. No such writ
'has ever issued. Even conceding the authority, this is not a
case for its exercise. It is not necessary for the protection of
the jurisdiction of this court: Hcldntire v. Wood, 7 Cranch
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504; Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75; Ex parte Oristy, 3

How. 292. Nor is the court acting without or in excess of
jurisdiction: Exparte Tuclcer, 1 M. & G. R. 519; ayor v. Cox,
L. R. 2 H. L. 239; Tinniswood v. Patterson,3 C. B. 243;
Iley v. Harvey, 5 D. & L. 648; Marsden v. Wardle, 3 E. &

B. 695; Thompson v. Ingham, 14 Q. B. 710; re Bowen, 21 L.
J., Q. B., 10; Earl of Huntington v. Ramsey, 8 Exch. 879;
Mossop v. Great Northern 1B. R. Co., 17 C. B. 130; Norris v.
Carrington,16 0. B., N. S., 996.
The writ of prohibition, as known to the Federal judiciary,
is in the nature of appellate process; and will go to no court
over which the tribunal awarding it has not appellate jurisdiction: MARSMLL, C. "J.,in Cohens v. State of Virginia, 6
Wheaton 392; 21arbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137; 1 Curtis'
Comm., sec. 198; U. S. v. Peters,3 Dall. 121; Ex parte Gor.

don, 1 Black, R., 503; Conklin's Treatise, 67-8. In no event,
and under no circumstances, are the proceedings and judgments of a State court amenable to the supervision of the
United States Circuit Courts: Act of 1789, section 2 and 22;
Act of March 3, 1803. The State court is not an inferior
court. It is a foreign court of independent jurisdiction.
WOODRUFF, Circuit J.-The petition gives with much detail

facts and circumstances tending to show that the purpose and
effect of the prosecution of the several writs in the Superior
Court, and motions therein to enforce obedience to the injunctions, is to defeat the operation of the adjudication of the District Court and hinder or obstruct the administration of the
property of the bankrupts by the District Court under the
bankrupt law of the United States, and it is thereupon prayed
that this court will, pursuant to the fourteenth section of the
Act of the Congress of the United States, passed September 4,
1789, entitled "An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the
United States," issue a writ of prohibition addressed to the
said Superior Court and the judges thereof prohibiting the
said court and the said judges from further entertaining the
said actions or from entertaining any other or further proceedings on the petition, application or at the suit of the said Clark
for the purpose of interfering with the said adjudication and

U. S. V THE SUPERIOR COURT.

jurisdiction of the said District Court, or from interfering
with or nullifying the effect of the jurisdiction of this court
under the Act of Congress.
It is not suggested that this court has power to issue the
writ prayed for unless the authority is conferred by or is implied
from some express statute, and both in the petition and in the
brief submitted by the counsel for the petitioners, such power
is sought to be derived from the fourteenth section of the Act
of Congress of 1789, commonly known as "the Judiciary Act. '
That section provides that all of the courts of the United States
in the-Act before mentioned, including the Circuit Court, "shall
have power to issue writs of scirefacias,habeas corpus, and al
other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may
be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions
and agreeable to the principles and usages of law:" 1 Stat.
81: In ex.parte Christy, 3 How. 292, the Supreme Court of
the United States, referring to this section and to section 13,
which gives express power to that court to issue writs of prohibition to the District Courts when proceeding as Courts of
Admiralty and Maritime jurisdiction, by the opinion of Mr.
Justice STORY, disclaimed any general authority to issue a writ
of prohibition'to the District Court in cases in bankruptcy,
over whose orders and decrees in such cases the Supreme
Court possessed no revising power, however the District Court
exceeded its jurisdiction. And the ground stated is, that the
District Court, by such orders and decrees, did not interfere
with, evade or obstruct any appellate authority of the Supreme Court. Without, therefore, pausing to inquire whether,
under the said fourteenth section, this court has power, and
if so, in what cases, to issue a writ of prohibition to a State
court, it is clear that, if the power exist, the limitation is
explicit which confines that power to cases wherein such writ
is "necessary for the exercise of the jurisdiction of this
court;" and since the power is not claimed to exist under any
grant of general jurisdiction, or to have been conferred by any
other statute, the test of the power to issue the writ now
applied for lies in the inquiry whether, in the case made by
the petition, such writ is necessary for the exercise of any
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jurisdiction now vested in the Circuit Court in the matter in
litigation, and is agreeable to the principles and usages of law.
What, then, is the jurisdiction which this court has over the
proceedings set forth in the petition? First-by a petition of
review, Clark, the plaintiff in the actions in the Superior
Court, has sought in this court a review of the decree of the
District Court, wherein he is adjudged a bankrupt, and, for
the purposes of that review, this court has acquired jurisdic
tion of those proceedings. But the exercise of that jurisdic.
tion is in no wise obstructed or interfered with by the actions
prosecuted by him in the Superior Court. He may pursue
that appeal to the revisory power of this court, and the
respondents therein may here insist upon the correctness of
the decree of the District Court, and this court will proceed
to hear and reverse or affirm that decree, entirely unaffected
by the pendency or the prosecution of those actions, and the
action of this court in the matter of that review terminates
with such affirmance or reversal. If such decree is affirmed.
the decree of the District Court stands as the decree of that
court and not of this, and to be carried into due execution by
that and not this court. Sacond-The argument of the counsel for the petitioners involves the assumption that, by force of
the second section of the Act of Congress, commonly called the
bankrupt law, this court possesses, concurrently with the District Court, all the powers conferred by the first section upon
the last-named court, and therefore, whatever impedes the
execution of the decrees of the District Court, or obstructs or
interferes with the administration of the estate of the bankrupts by that court, warrants the petitioners in insisting that
the exercise of the jurisdiction of this court is obstructed or
hindered, and in claiming in this court that the writ of prohibition is necessary. In the first place this overlooks the
familiar doctrine that, where the jurisdiction of two courts is
concurrent, the one which first obtains jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties by the actual institutional proceedings therein, holds such jurisdiction exclusively of tne
other. But in the next place, the Act of Congress does not so
blend or confound the two courts in the administration of the
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bankrupt law. The courts are distinct under that act, as under all others, and exercise a separate jurisdiction, each in its
own sphere. This is not supposed to be doubtful in respect
to the appellate jurisdiction, conferred on the Circuit Court by
the eighth or twenty-fourth section of the act, to review, by
appeal or writ of error, the proceedings of the District Court,
nor in respect to actions at law or in equity, whereof the two
courts are declared to have concurrent jurisdiction, as, for example, actions brought by or against the assignee in bankruptcy, as provided in the second section. Nor is it at all to
be suggested that proceedings in bankruptcy can be initiated
in this court. For that purpoge the jurisdiction of -theDistrict
Court is plainly exclusive. The provisions of the second section relied upon are those which declare that "the several
Circuit Courts within and for the districts where the proceedings in bankruptcy shall be pending shall have a general superintendence and jurisdiction of all cases and questions arising
under this act, and, except when special provision is otherwise
made, may, upon bill, petition, or other proper process of any
party aggrieved, hear and determine the case as a Court .of
Equity." The claim that the prohibition prayed for in the
petition herein is necessary to the exercise of the jurisdiction
of this court, in the matter of the bankruptcy of Clark and
Bininger, can only rest upon the ground that by force of the
language above cited, it is competent for the parties to come
into this court and seek original orders and decrees in the due
and ordinary course of such proceedings, either to facilitate
the completion thereof or to carry them into effect; that the
proceedings having been duly instituted, the parties have an
option to apply to either court to expedite or consummate
the same; and in short, that so soon as such proceedings
have been begun they may be continued in either court, or
partly in one and partly in the other. And yet, when this
claim is thus broadly stated, no counsel will, I think, seriously
insist that tne section warrants so unprecedented and extraordinary a confusion of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, to insist that
* this court has jurisdiction in the proceedings themselves to
make orders in specific execution or enforcement of the decrees
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or orders of the District Court, involves all that is above suggested. The superintendence and jurisdiction conferred in that
clause of the second section are revisory of cases and questions
arising in the District Court, and contemplate a review of what
is presented to that court for consideration and decision. They
may include the power which in a special and perhaps more
restricted form was given in the sixth section of the Bankrupt
Act of 1841, wherein authority was givento adjourn any point
or question arising in any case in bankruptcy into the Circuit
Court, to be there heard and determined; and it may be that
under the present act the presentation of such questions, and
the jurisdiction of this court over them, does not, as in the former, depend upon the discretion of the District Court, as to
which it is not necessary to express an opinion; but in either
view the questions, or cases presenting sueh questions, must
arise in the District Court, and their determination in this court
is either for the guidance or control of the District Court.
This is not a jurisdiction to assume the conduct of the proceedings or to specially enforce or execute the orders or decrees of.
that court. For that purpose the District Court has ample and
exclusive power. This jurisdiction, which is given for revisory
and perhaps advisory purposes to the Circuit Court, it can exercise, notwithstanding the pendency and the prosecution of the
actions mentioned in the petition herein. The exercise of that
jurisdiction is not obstructed by anything shown by the petition.
The jurisdiction of this court in the case in question, so far as
shown by the petition for the writ of prohibition, arises on a
petition for a review of the adjudication, made in the District
Court declaring Bininger & Clark bankrupts. There is no impediment to the exercise of that jurisdiction. The alleged
proceedings in the State court in nowise interfere therewith. A
prohibition of such action in the State court, as is set out in the
petition, is not necessary for the exercise of any jurisdiction in
the matter of the bankruptcy of Bininger & Clark which the
Circuit Court has acquired. This court can review, in the
manner and for all the purposes contemplated by the second
section of the act, the orders, decisions and decrees already
made, or which may be made, in the District Court. Such

CLARE v. BININGER.

review cannot be rendered inoperative or ineffectual by any
action of the State court. It belongs to the District Court,
anid not to this, to carry into execution its orders and decrees.
If,
therefore, it be assumed that a State court stands in such a
relation to the Federal court, that " agreeably to the principles
and usages of law," a writ of prohibition could be issued by the
latter to the former, the petition before us does not present a
case in which spch writ is necessary to the exercise of our
jurisdiction.
I have preferred to place the opinion upon the grounds above
stated, not only because these questions of the construction of
the second section are of immediate practical importance, but
also because they are directly involved in and are decisive of'
other motions pending before us in the same proceedings in
bankruptcy mentioned in the petition.
The motion must be denied.

Suerior Court of New York.
ABRAHAM B. CLARK v. ABRAHAM BININGER.
Where the jurisdiction of a State court has attachedl, as e. g. in a bill for an
account between partners, and property has passed into the hands of a receiver under its order, the jurisdiction Is not disturbed by a subsequent adjudi.
cation of bankruptcy of the parties, and the title of the receiver is superior to
that of the assignee in bankruptcy.
The Bankrupt Act does not authorize the courts of bankruptcy to enjoin a
State court even in the matter of the distribution of the assets of an insolvent
partnership,nor does it declare them the only courts in which such distribution can be made.

On November 19, 1869, the plaintiff, Clark, brought an
action in this court, in the nature of a bill in equity, for an
account in partnership and an adjustment and distribution of
the assets. On the same day a receiver was appointed, who
took immediate possession of the property, which is still held.
pending the action. On December 11, 1869, proceedings in
bankruptcy were commenced in the United States District
Court, for Southern District of New York, against the partner-
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ahip of Bininger & Clark, and on the 22d of December they
were adjudicated bankrupts. Subsequently John S. Beecher
was appointed assignee, and attempted to take possession of
the property. This was a motion to punish him for contempt
for such action.
Roger A. Pryor and James F. .1organ, for the motion.
. Bangs, contra.

F.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
McCuN,

J.-[After stating the facts.]-The regularity and

validity of the proceedings in this court, are not to be impeached by any Federal tribunal: Sec. 1, Art. IV. U. S. Constitution; Ex parte Burns, 7 Am. Law Reg. 105; Atkinson
v. Purdy, Crabbe 551; United States v. Howland, 4 W heaton

108.
The instant the receiver took possession, the copartnership
property passed into the custody and control of this court,
of which he was the officer. His possession is the possession
of the court.
So by virtue of the order of this court appointing the re
ceiver, and the filing his bond in pursuance of that order, the
receiver was vested with the legal title to all the copartnership property; that property, in contemplation of law, is no
longer the property of the copartnership, and their only interest in it is an equitable right to whatever surplus may
remain after satisfaction of the copartnership's creditors.
Recognizing and respecting the legitimate powers of the
District Cou.-L, I nevertheless contest the authority of that
honorable court to oust the already attached jurisdiction of
the Superior Court, and to compel the surrender, by its officer, of property duly and lawfully in its custody, and which
is now in course of judicial administration.
That court, as a court of bankruptcy, is the crehture of
statute, and has no power beyond that expressly conferred
upon it: Ex yarte Campbell, 7 Am. Law Reg. 100.

Antecedently to and independently of the Bankrupt Act of
2d March, 1867, that court had no authority to enjoin parties
or proceedings in a State court, nor otherwise in any way to
20
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interfere with its process or proceedings: Act of March 2,
1793; 1 Kent's Com. 412; 3 Story's Comm. 521-626.
No such authority is conferred by the Bankrupt Act of 2d
March, 1867-neither in terms nor by implication: Ex parte
Campbell, supra; Clarke v. Rist, 3 McLean 494; Matter of
Burns, 7 Am. Law Reg. 105; Atkinson v. Purdy, Crabbe
551.
The Bankrupt Act expressly reserves and preserves intact
all liens existing at the commencement of the proceedings in
bankruptcy: Sec. 14; Clarke v. Rist, supra; .Ex *parteDonaldson, 7 Am. Law. Reg. 213; Matter of Allen, I N. Y. Legal
Obs. 115; Re Housberger & Zibelin, 2 B. R. 33..
Upon familiar principles, each partner has a speefic lien on
the copartnership property, for the satisfaction of the copartnership debts, and for the payment of any surplus that may
remain to him after the adjustment of the rights and equities
between themselves; and the object of a suit in equity between
partners-particularly of the action in the Superior Court--is
to enforce and effectuate that lien: Lindley on Partn. 577.
The intent and policy of the bankrupt law of 1.867, is to
insure an equitable appropriation of the debtor's property to
the satisfaction of the claims of creditors; hence, the only
transfers and assignments which it denounces and invalidates,
are transfers and assignments in preference or in fraud of
creditors(See. 39). Nothing in the Bankrupt Act distinguishes
and declares the District Court the only forum where a just
and equitable distribution of the debtor's property can be consummated; and the jurisdiction of other tribunals of competent authority, except in administration of bankruptcy, is
neither expressly nor impliedly excluded.
When this court acquired jurisdiction of the copartnership,
no proceeding in bankruptcy had been instituted, and there
was theA no pretense of claim for the jurisdiction of the
District Court.
The amity subsisting between the tribunals of kindred and
associated governments, forbids the suggestion in the District
Court that the action in this, the Superior Court, can terminate otherwisethani an equitable administration of the copart.
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nership effects; nor can it be contended for a moment that
the commencement of an action in a State c3urt is an act of
bankruptcy,1 nor is it obnoxious to the provisions or policy
of the bankruptcy law.
The Superior Court of the city of New York, and the District Court, in administering the affairs of dissolved or insolvent copartnerships, proceed upon the same principles and
with an equal solicitude to protect the rights of creditors;
hence, there is no occasion, with a view to justice or equity,
why the District Court should attempt to oust the jurisdiction of this court.
My position is grounled as well upon authority as reason.
In the cases cited below-all Federal adjudications-the power
and jurisdiction claimed for the District Court were, in some
instances, impliedly, and in others, most expressly and distinctly, disclaimed and repudiated by the very tribunals in
whose favor these anomalous pretensions were asserted: Sedgwick v. Afin,7, I B. R. 204; Se egwick v. Place, 1 B. R. 204;
3fatter qf Campbell, 7 Am. Law Reg. 100; In re Burns, 7
Am. Law Reg. 105; Hawkins' Appeal, 8 Am. Law Reg. 205;
Taylor v. Orryl, 20 How. 584; Ex parte Allen, 1 N. Y.
Legal Observer 115; Clarke v. Rist, 3 McLean, 494; Sullivan v. Hieskell, Crabbe 525 ; Ex parte Dudley, 1 Penn. L. J.
302, 323; Atkinson v. Patrdy, Crabbe 551; Ex parte Donaldson, 7 Am. Law Reg. 213; Afatter of Smith, I B. R. 169;
in re Hill, 2 B. R. 53; Langqley v. Perry, 8 Am. Law Reg.
428; Farrinv. Crazford, 2 B. R. 181; In re Marks, 2 B.
R. 175; Re Hazleton, 2 B. R. 12; Peck v. Jenness, 7 How.

U. S. 612, 625,
Let us see what some of the most learned and eminent members (f our Federal courts say upon this subject. In 1868
Judge HCCATDrss, of the western district of Pennsylvania,
says, in Afatter of Canvbell, a bankrupt, cited above (that was

a motion to dissolve an injunction against the sheriff, and
which was granted): "Have we the right to interfere with the
courts of a State in the legitimate exercise of their functions ?
After much reflection, I am satisfied we have not, nor with the
ISee decision of BLATCHFORn.

J., contra, referred to in note Infra, p. 309.
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actors or parties litigating before them." After citing some
portions of the bankrupt law, whereby those without legal
acumen might be led to think some power was granted to interfere with State courts and their proceedings, he says, "staring
them in the face was the Act of the 2d of March, 1793." Section five expressly declaring "nor shall a writ of injunction be
granted to stay proceedings in any court of a State," and Judge
MCCANDLESS in the same case expressly holds "that there is
nothing in the bankrupt law to repeal this statute," and the
authority conferred by the fortieth section of the act to protect
the debtor's property, "does not refer to the courts of a State
or to their executive officers. It was not designed to arrest
the whole machinery of another and independent forum, which
is exercising its best efforts to marshal the assets of the debtor,
and after discharging the legitimate liens to which they are
subject, reserving the residue as a fund for the assignee in
bankruptcy;" and I hold that there could not be language
more in point to the case at bar than this language. Again, he
says: "When the jurisdiction of a court, and the right of a
plaintiff to prosecute his suit in it have once attached, that
right cannot be arrested or taken away by proceedings in another
court. These rules have their foundation not merely in comity
but in necessity." Again, he says: "Neither can one take
property from the custody of the other by replevin or other
p-ocess, for this would produce a conflict of jurisdiction extremely embarrassing in the administration of justice." ** *
Hence, he says: "That the United States Court has no supremacy or power by injunction over the State courts," and he
holds, there is "no provision in that act which limits the jurisdiction of the State courts, or confers any power on the Bankrupt Court, to supersede their jurisdictionor wrest propertyfrom
,the cistody of their ofters," on the contrary he says, "In other
words, as to the estate or property of the bankrupt the assignee
'is subrogated to all his rights and responsibilities. The act
(Bankrupt Act) sends the assignee to the State court, and
admits its power over him. It confers no authority on this
r.ourt (the United States court) to restrain proceeding therein
by injunction or other process, much less to take property out
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of its custody or possession with a strong hand ;" and he finally
concludes by saying that "we shall, therefore, be compelled to
dissolve this-and all other injunctions in similar cases," Mr
Justice GRIER fully concurring in the above views. Mr. Justice MOCANDLESS holds even stronger language in the case of
William Burns, 7 Am. Law Reg. 105. There he holds that
if the lien upon the property is fraudulent, or void, its validity
must be tested in' the State court. So Mr. Justice LEAvT
held in the case of Clarle v. Rist, cited above, "that the equitable interests of the bankrupt in the property in question did
not pass or vest in the assignee, and that the United States
Court had no power to withdraw the interests of property from

final disposition of the State court." In finally disposing of that
case, the learned judge said: "When a State tribunal has
taken jurisdiction of a case, though having connection with an
estate in bankruptcy, it affords no sufficient reason for its with-

drawal from that jurisdiction that a Federal court might take
cognizance over it; and it is proper that the Federal courts

should cautiously abstain from the unnecessary exertion of
powers which may bring them into conflict with the State
courts2' For, as he properly observes, "nothing can tend to
the more serious disturbance of the harmonious action of the
State and Federal authorities than such conflicts."
In conclusion, I am obliged to adjudge the respondent
guilty of a technical contempt of court; but in consideration
that he disavows any intentional disrespect of our authority,
and protests his conduct was controlled by the advice of counsel, I will dismiss him with only a nominal punishment. So
much suffices for the vindication of our authority. I trust
the respondent will spare us the necessity of any more severe
assertion of that authority.
As the other lranches of this much
litigated case may be of interest to
our readers, we give a brief summary
of them.
In Hardy and others v. Bininger &
Ozark, on petition of creditors for adjildication of bankruptcy, against the
defendants. Judge BLATCHFORD, In the

United States District Court for the
Southern District of New Ycrk, decided that a bail led by one partner
in a State court, praying for the appointment of a receiver, and the adju-tment and distribution of tue partnership assets, was aprocuringot their
property to be taken on legal proceps.
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and an act of bankruptcy within sect. to discontinue the latter that his po.
89 of the Bankrupt Act. The insol-Stition of review be dismissed. The
vency of the firn was admitted, and court, however, declined to make
on the question of the intent to defeat t such order, holding that, as the jurisor delay the operation of the act, Judge diction was given by the Act of ConBL&atroRD held that the effect of* gress, the petitioner who presented
the appointment of a receiver, and and prosecuted his appeal in due
his taking possession of the property form was entitled to be heard: Be
being in fact to defeat or delay the Bininger&a.,3 Bank. Reg. 122.
Next the assignee presented to the
operation of the act, the defendants
must be conclusively presumed to District Court a petition playing:
have intended that result to follow. 1. That the U. S. Marshal be directed
Ile therefore made an adjudication of to take the property out of the hands
bankruptcy against them: 3 Bank. of the receiver. 2. That the receiver
and Clark be enjoined from farther
Reg. 99.
From this adjudication Clark, one interference with the property; and
of the defendants, appealed to the 3. That Clark be enjoined from fnrther prosecution of his action in the
Circuit Court.
An assignee having been appointed, State court. BLA=caFORD, J., held
attempted to take the property out of that all the property of Clark, and
the receiver's hands, and for this was rights relating thereto, having passed
adjudged guilty of contempt by the by the adjudication of bankruptcy to
State court in the principal case.
his assignee, the latter was entitled
The creditors then petitioned the to be substituted in the action in the
Circuit Court for a wlt of prohibi- State court, and an order, therefore,
tion to the State court, which was was made on Clark to execute such
refused by Judge WoOnauFv, as re- papers as would enable the assignee
to be admitted to prosecute the action
ported ante p.
The assignee then petitioned the in the State court in his own name;
Circuit Court for an order to the U. and an injunction on Clark not to
S. Marshal to take possession of the proceed further in that case without
property. This was also refused, on leave of this court. The considerathe ground set forth in U. S. v. Judges tion of the order on the marshal and
of the Superior Court, ante p. 297, that tile injunction to the receiver prayed
the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court for, was postponed: Re Clark & BinSubsewas revisory only: Be Clark & .Bin- inger, 3 Bank. Reg. 123.
quently BLATCHFORD, J., refused to
wlger, 3 Bank. Reg. 122.
. Clark having commenced proceed- make these orders,
holding that, as
ings in the State court to enjoin the thre Superior Court had jurisdiction
petitioning creditors from prosecuting over the parties and the subject mattheir petition, the assignee and credi- ter at the time the receiver was ap.
tors next moved the Circuit Court for pointed, his possession could not be
an order on Clark to elect whether he disturbed by any order from this
would proceed with his petition of court, thus concurring with the
review in this court or his action in opinion of the Superior Court In
the State court, and unless lie elected the principal case.
J. T. AL

RAY v. SCHOONER BELLE.

United States District Court, District of Wisconsin.
RAY V. SCHOONER 31ILWAUKEE BELLE.
(oods laden on deck and jettisoned do not make a case for general average.
Forty tons of pig lead were shipped on the deck of 9 schooner with consent
of the shipper, who took a bill of lading with " dangers of navigation ex"
cepted." ]art of the lead was properly thrown overboard for relief of the vessol in a storm: Held, the vessel is not liable to contribute for the loss.
The fact that the shipment of the lead on deck was sought by the master for
the purpose of trimming his vessel held not to be material.

THIS was a libel in admiralty for contribution for loss by
jettison.
Cary & Rea, for libelants.
Emmons & T-an Dyke, for claimants.
MILLER, D. J.-Libelants shipped on board this schooner
at the port of Racine, in the State of Wisconsin, divers pigs of
lead to be transported to the port of Buffalo, in the State of
New York. By the bill of lading the pigs of lead were shipped
on deck, in good condition, to be delivered in like good order,
the dangers of navigation excepted. The schooner was laden
with wheat in bulk. It is alleged in the libel, that at the time
the lead was received on board, the vessel was so badly steve.
dored, that she was not in a proper condition to safely take it
on deck, or to safely transport it according to the tenor or effect of the bill of lading, or to safely and securely hold and
carry the under-deck cargo. And that the vessel being in an
unseaworthy condition, set sail on her intended voyage with
the lead on board. And by reason of the vessel not being well
trimmed, and not in condition to resist the ordinary perils of
the sea by reason of said improper trimming, and not by any
embarrassment or danger caused by the lead being on deck,
the officers and crew of the vessel jettisoned the lead from on
the deck into the waters of Lake Michigan, whereby the lead
became wholly lost, and was not delivered according to the
tenor and effect of the bill of lading.
Libelants demand strict proof whether the jettisoa was made
necessary by a peril of the sea, or from improper stowage of
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the under-deck cargo. And if jettison were made necessary
by a peril of the sea, then by the custom and course of the
admiralty and maritime laws, they claim that the loss is a
case of general average loss.
Claimants in their answer confess the shipment of the lead,
and they urge that the vessel being tight, staunch and strong,
and well manned, equipped, and having a cargo of 14,700"
bushels of wheat in her hold, sufficiently and properly stowed
and secured, and forty tons of pig lead shipped on deck, pursuant to the bill of lading, left the port of Racine, bound for the
port of Buffalo, and while on the voyage on Lake Michigan, she
encountered a severe gale, labored hard, shipping much water
on deck, filling herself, and rendering it necessary to knock
away the bulwarks to free her, and the gale increasing, it became necessary for the preservation of the vessel, and of the
lives of the ufficers and crew, and for the safety of the whole, the
officers, on consultation, determined to jettison a portion of the
lead, and thereupon they jettisoned about 838 pigs, and on arriving at Buffblo, the whole cargo was delivered, except the
pigs of lead jettisoned. It is also averred that the cargo under
deck was not a full cargo, and was so known to the agent of the
shippers, and the lead was shipped on deck at the request of'
said agent. The answer further alleges that the loss so occurred
by a peril of the sea, is not a general average loss, nor is the
same to be contributed for in general average.
It is agreed between the advocates of the parties, that the
storm was of force and violence sufficient to render the jettison
necessary. The proof sustains the allegation that the master
solicited the lead for the purpose of trimming his vessel. The
proof does not establish the custom to ship lead on deck. That
has been done in several instances for the purpose of trimming
grain-bearing vessels, but to establish a custom derogating from
the general law, it is not enough to prove that the act has been
frequently done. It must be proven to be so generally known
and recognized, that a fair presumption arises that the parties
in entering into their engagement, do it with reference to
the custom; and tactily agree that their rights and responsibilities shall be determined by it. This case does not rest on
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custom, there being an express agreement between the
freighter and the master of the vessel, that the lead should
be stowed on deck.
The question presented for the consideration of the court is,
is the loss of the lead by the jettison a general average loss?
The general cargo having been delivered at the port of destination, upon payment of the freight, the demand is against the
vessel alone for her proportional contribution. Under the
view taken of the point presented, I will not consider whether
this libel can be maintained against this vessel, after delivery
of the cargo.
It appears that the mdster having ascertained that his vessel was not trimmed, applied to the agent of the owner of the
lead, to ship it on deck, for the purpose of trimming the vessel for the voyage, and thereby rendering her seaworthy.
From this fact negligence is not chargeable to the master, In
respect to putting the vessel in trim. The jettison was rendered necessary by a peril of the sea, for the safety of the
vessel and cargo, and was a loss by the peril of the sea.
It is a general and an ancient rule of the law of shipping,
that goods shall not be carried on deck. Reasons for this rule
are, that goods placed on deck are more liable to be lost by
being swept overboard, and to damage by water and endanger
both ship and cargo, as the weight is put far from the hold,
and thereby makes the vessel less stable and less manageable,
and more apt to labor in a heavy sea. And it incumbers the
deck and embarrasses the crew in working a sail vessel, and
perhaps the common safety sometimes may not require jettison: if lading were not on deck to bring the dangers on the
vessel, or contribute to enhance them.
The rule is also a general rule, that goods laden on deck and
jettisoned are not contributed for, and such is particularly the
rule when goods are laded on deck by consent of the shipper.
I have had this matter under consideration in former cases.
and must dispense with reference to the very'numerous cases
iffirming this rule. Maritime orders and rules, both ancient
and modern, recognize the distinction between cargoes placed
on deck with consent of the freighter, and cargoes under deek.
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They do not give a recourse against the master, the vessel, or
the owner. The Admiralty Courts of England and America
have almost uniformly treated the owner of goods on deck
with his consent, as not having a claim on the master, in ease
of jettison, although bound to contribute.
This being a proceeding against a sail-vessel, I shall not
enter upon the consideration of some modern judgments against
vessels propelled by steam. The case of Lawrence v. Minturn,
17 Howard 100, is referred to, as a leading case of binding
authority. The ship Hornet was libelled for non-delivery of
two steam-boilers and chimneys shipped at New York, on deck
by special agreement, and consigned to libellant in San Francisco. It being discovered on the voyage, that the ship could
not be navigated with safety in a storm, the deck load was
thrown overboard. The facts in the case show that the jettison
wasjustifiable, and the loss occasioned by the peril of the sea
The court say, "This bill of lading declares that the property
is to go on deck. It excepts perils of the sea. The exception
must be construed with reference to the particular adventure,
which the contract of the affreightment shows was contemplated by the parties, under this bill of lading. The question
is not, what in other circumstances could be deemed a peril of
the sea, but what is to be deemed such when operating on this
vessel, with this deck load. If a very burdensome cargo like
iron is taken on board, and heavy weather met with, and jettision made, it would not be a ground of claim against the owner
that the weather encountered would not have been sufficient to
justify a jettison, if the cargo had been cotton. And when this
freighter consented to place Qn the deck of this ship his boilers
and chimneys, weighing upward of thirty tons, not distributed
about the deck, but lying in a small space, must he not be taken
to have known that their necessary effect might be to embarrass the sailing of the ship in a gale of wind, and cause her to
labor in a heavy sea." The libel was dismissed. In this case
libellants having shipped on deck eleven hundred and sixty pigs
)flead weighing about forty tons, they consented that the vessel
might thereby be rendered less manageable, and more liable
to labor in a storm, and they, and not the vessel, must bear
the loss of a portion of the deck load by the necessary jettison.

